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This paper analyses the mass privatisation programme (MPP) implemented in Poland
in the mid-1990s from the perspective of transition reforms and the development of
corporate governance systems. Although the programme covered only 512 companies
the collected evidence provides a unique opportunity to compare the Polish MPP to
the schemes implemented in other post-socialist economies of the Czech Republic,
Slovakia and Russia as well as to other privatisation methods applied in Poland. The
Polish MPP created intermediaries in the form of National Investment Funds (NIF),
which were granted the leading and minor status in the ownership of their portfolio
companies. The clear ownership and the incentive structure appeared to be important
mechanisms that helped minimse the control vacuum and stimulated restructuring and
privatisation of the portfolio companies. Despite the restructuring efforts the financial
results remain relatively blurred and the performance of privatised companies as well
and the funds appear to be disappointing.
Introduction
Since 1989 Poland has been grouped with the transition economies shifting from
central planning to a market economy. The transition process includes significant
changes in the political, social and economic system. Although the political changes
are indisputably an important part of the transition, the development and direction of
change can be only sustained and reinforced by economic success, or at least
improvement. It is agreed that the creation of more efficient governance mechanisms
is a crucial aspect of transition reforms.
The privatisation process is one of the most important reforms from the perspective
of transition as well as for the development of corporate governance structures. At the
end of 2006 the private sector generated 80% of GDP. Out of 8,453 state owned
companies in 1990, 7,147 were privatised by the end of 2004.
2 A total of 2,885
companies were privatised via direct privatisation, which appeared to be the dominant
ownership transformation scheme, 1,545 companies were commercialised, 352
underwent indirect privatisation, 512 were included in the mass privatisation
programme and 1,853 were covered by liquidation procedures. However, in the
register of January 2005 there were 1,306 state enterprises and the state still is
involved in 15% of privatised companies in Poland.
The goal of this paper is to present the mass privatisation scheme introduced in
Poland in mid-1995 in the form of National Investment Funds and on the basis of
collected evidence to answer questions on the effectiveness of the mass privatisation
programme in Poland. The assessment of the Polish MPP will include two levels of
analysis: a comparative analysis of the NIF programmes versus other privatisation
methods applied in Poland such as direct sale to foreign and domestic investors,
1 Corresponding author: Maria Aluchna, Ph.D., Department of Management Theory, Warsaw School of
Economics, Al. Niepodleglosci 164, r. 1102, 02-554 Warszawa, Poland, tel.: 0048 22 564 82 60, fax:
0048 22 564 3941, email: maria.aluchna@sgh.waw.pl Comments welcome.
2 Ministerstwo Skarbu Państwa (State Treasury), Ocena przebiegu prywatyzacji majatku Skarbu
Panstwa w 2004 roku (The report on privatisation reforms in 2004), Warsaw 2005:10.88
Management and Employee Buyouts (MEBO) and sub-stage of commercialisation;
and an international comparative analysis of mass privatisation programmes
implemented in other Central and East European countries: Russia, the Czech and
Slovak Republics as well as East Germany and Estonia. On the basis of previous
research as well as the most common problems of transition economies the criteria for
assessing the NIF scheme will be the following:
1. Shifting ownership of assets from state to private hands;
2. Enhancing the performance of companies by privatisation to strategic
investors, restructuring of the companies and reducing the control vacuum and
looting carried out mostly by powerful opportunistic insiders;
3. Acceleration and increasing the scope of the privatisation process;
4. Reducing the costs of ownership change from the perspective of the state;
5. Distribution of, at least part of, the ‘national’ wealth to Polish citizens;
6. Development of corporate governance mechanisms;
7. Boosting public interest and participation in the stock market.
The remainder is organised as follows. In the first section the paper discusses the
programme designing process, the goals and the stages of the programme. The
second section analyses the functioning of the NIFs and their role in corporate
governance. The third section discusses the results of NIFs restructuring activity. The
fourth section concludes the paper with an overall assessment of the mass
privatisation and its contribution to the development of the corporate governance
system in Poland.
1. The mass privatisation programme
After 1989 Poland applied the radical approach to macroeconomic reforms (so-called
shock therapy). The mass privatisation programme was, however, significantly
delayed. The main reasons behind this delay were rooted mostly in political changes
and the unwillingness of political parties to formulate the goals of the mass
privatisation scheme precisely
3. The authors of the Polish MPP could rely on the
experience of other countries, especially Russia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic and
prevent the privatised companies from mushrooming and expropriation by insiders.
Political turmoil and insecurity, however, did not provide a good environment for
foreign investors. The delay also affected the attitude of workers in the companies
chosen to join the programme and led to the further deterioration of NIFs portfolio
companies, which were in desperate need of capital and restructuring.
The main goal of the programme was to assist the shifting of assets from state-
owned companies to private ones and to intensify and extend the range of ownership
transformation. The initial plan was to create open public investment funds for the
mass privatisation programme, which would then become private funds. The mandate
of the NIFs was to promote the development of profitable and valuable companies
operating in Poland and to permit the public to participate by enabling them to acquire
shares in the NIFs. Moreover, selling companies through an intermediary and not
directly by the state reduced the costs of the ownership change. Finally, in many cases
the government realised there were not enough investors with substantial capital
interested in buying out state-owned companies.
3 Stanisława Teresa Surdykowska, Prywatyzacja, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, Warszawa 1997: 140.89
1.1. The scheme
The Polish MPP covered 512 large and medium, mainly manufacturing, state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) with about 10% of industrial sector sales to participate in 15
National Investment Funds. Each SOE was incorporated as a joint stock company,
60% of the shares were allocated to the NIF scheme, 15% was given free to
employees and 25% was retained by the state
4.
The NIF privatisation stage
In December 1994 the supervisory boards of NIFs were officially appointed and
started negotiations with management companies. By July 1995, NIFs established as
companies by Company Act with capital of 100,000 PLN provided by the state as
subsidy selected their fund management companies and signed 10-year agreements
with them
5. In March 1995 portfolio companies were distributed amongst NIFs on a
random basis to ensure that all funds would end up with approximately equal amounts
of assets under their control. The distribution of the share was carried out in a number
of rounds on four occasions. As a result many funds ended up with diversified
portfolios not concentrated on any particular industry. In the end each NIF gained the
lead status in 34-35 firms and minority status (of 1.93% shares) in around 477 firms.
NIFs held 60% of a company’s shares and were to manage the sale of the shares
6. In
order to ensure that NIFs would play an active role in the companies they had in their
portfolios, provisions in the MPP stipulated that leading stakes had to be sold only as
a whole, whereas the minority stakes were the subject of unrestricted trading. Figure 1
illustrates the structure that each NIF ended up with.
Figure 1: Illustration of the initial NIF structure
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Source: based on www.magnapolonia.com.pl
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477 companies in which NIF has the
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From November 1995 until November 1996 the state-owned bank PKO BP started to
distribute the ownership certificates for a fee of PLN 20 ($7-8). The certificate
functioned as a claim to the ownership of funds. Each adult Pole could take a
certificate and then convert it into 15 shares (1 share per each NIF)
7. Figure 2 presents
the pace of certificate distribution.
Figure 2: Pace of certificate distribution
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Source: Source: Ministry of State Treasury, ‘Report of NIF programme 1997-2003’
Funds commercial phase
In March 1997 NIFs shares were listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. The Treasury,
which held 100% of shares of NIFs at this point, began to transfer 85% of these shares
to certificate holders who applied for the conversion of their certificates through a
brokerage house. The remaining 15% was kept by the Treasury for the payment of
performance and loyalty fees by the fund management companies. In June 1997 the
certificates and shares of NIFs were listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. Certificate
prices went significantly up starting from PLN 50, reaching PLN 175 (the highest
price) by February 1997 and then falling back to about PLN 150 by June 1997.
During the last day of quotation (last session in December 1998) a certificate was
worth 62 PLN which makes it 40% lower than the IPO price. The NIF index reached
its top value during the first weeks of quotation and since then NIF shares prices fell
reaching around 1/3 of that value in 2005. Figure below presents NIF index 1997-
2005.
7 The initial public interest in the mass privatisation programme was striking: 25 855 417 out of 27 395
000 eligible Poles (94.5%) took part in that programme, although the authors of the MPP predicted a
far lower participation of about 10 million citizens.91
Figure 3: NIF index (points) 1997-2003
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Source: own calculations based on reports of NIF programme and database of Bank
Ochrony Środowiska (available at www.bossa.pl)
As shown in figure 1 the value of the index fell after the listing date. The increase in
2004 and 2005 was connected to the dividend payout and the upward trend of the
stock exchange. Since 2006 the Warsaw Stock Exchange has not produced a NIF
index due to the end of the programme.
1.2. Companies selected for MPP
According to the estimates of the Ministry of Ownership Transformation there were
around 1100 companies, which could join the programme at the time the scheme was
under construction. However, the anti-privatisation lobby was strong and many
companies were not included in the scheme due to political reasons. Additionally, the
delay in the introduction of the programme also affected the number of companies
selected. Some of the potential company candidates were being privatised or had a
different status including large companies such as PKP (Polish railways) or LOT
(Polish airlines) and therefore did not qualify for the programme
8. Additionally,
alcohol and tobacco manufacturers, power plants, wood processing companies and
sugar manufacturers were excluded from the MPP mostly for political reasons and the
pressure of the anti-privatisation lobby. In August 1992 an estimated 600 companies
valued at PLN 150 billion (15% of the value of state-owned companies) were to join
the programme since that number was meant to be the ‘breakeven point’ of the
scheme. Since the 16 largest companies were excluded, the value of companies in the
MPP dropped to 6.56% of state-owned companies. As a result, many companies
selected for the programme represented “problematic” sectors such as food processing
or textile industries.
Companies selected for the NIF programme were, by Polish standards, large and
medium, though not the largest in size and were recruited mostly from the industrial
sector.
8 Szczepkowska, ‘Funkcjonowanie przedsiębiorstw w ramach grup kapitałowych na przykładzie
Narodowych Funduszy Inwestycyjnych’, 6; Surdykowska, Prywatyzacja, 239-40.92
Table 1: Characteristics of companies involved in NIF programme
Number of employees Sector Percentage
Up to 200 201-500 501-1000 More than
1000
Industry 80.5 9.2 23.6 25.8 21.9
Construction 14.6 1.4 6.1 5.9 1.2
Others 4.9 2.8 0.9 1.1 0.2
Total 100 13.4 30.6 32.8 23.2
Source: Szczepkowska, Funkcjonowanie przedsiębiorstw w ramach grup
kapitałowych na przykładzie Narodowych Funduszy Inwestycyjnych”, Uniwersytet
Szczeciński, p. 7
In terms of financial conditions the bottom line was profit equal to zero, with a
minimum turnover of $10 million. As a matter of fact, however, the financial position
of the companies varied significantly ranging from highly profitable to loss making:
while 1/5 of the portfolio companies were sound enough to be listed on the Warsaw
Stock Exchange in a short period of time, 31% of them were recording losses
9. The
approximate book value of their assets was over PLN 7 billion ($3 billion at the end
of 1994) although varying again from more than $43 million to $4.3 million.
1.3. Fund management companies
Fifteen case fund management companies sponsored by institutional investors, both
Polish and foreign, were usually contracted for two years with the option of contract
extension for up to 10 years. The compensation of the fund managers was based on:
1. One fixed fee paid annually in dollars and adjustable annually for inflation and
certain changes in the portfolio of the NIF. It was fixed for the 10-year life of the
fund management agreement. The management fee was fixed for each fund
separately via negotiations between the supervisory board and the fund
management company and it usually accounted for 2-3% of the asset value. The
aggregate fee for all funds was $42 million per annum
10.
2. Fees for a performance-based bonus included the annual performance fee from the
sale of 1% of the NIF’s assets and a loyalty fee of 5 % of the NIF’s assets at the
end of the 10-year contractual period.
The total remuneration of fund managers accounts for approximately 3.5-4.5% of the
value of the assets, which by Western standards is rather generous,
11 to enable the
fund managers’ to focus on the value of their portfolio companies and on value-
increasing policies.
9 Iraj Hashi, “The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation with a difference”,
Working Paper no. 99.5, Staffordshire University, 1999,
http://www.staffs.ac.uk/schools/business/economics/papers/ec1999-05.pdf, [accessed 15 April 2002]
(para. 10 of 37).
10 Hashi, “The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation with a difference”,
(para. 15 of 37).
11 Hashi, ‘The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation with a difference’,
(para. 16 of 37).93
2. Corporate governance in the MPP
Mass privatisation by definition leads to diffused ownership (shares/ vouchers
distributed amongst millions of citizens) and results in a vacuum of monitoring and
supervision and the increased discretion of managers who are likely to pursue self-
dealing at the expense of shareholders. The Polish mass privatisation programme was
designed to create a dominant owner for enterprises and to provide the appropriate
incentives for them which would in turn lead to the restructuring of the companies and
speeding up their transfer to the private sector. Thus the Polish MPP tried to overcome
the potential problems of investment funds identified in the case of Czech and Slovak
MPPs.
12 The characteristics and the role of investment funds participating in mass
privatisations in Central and East European counties received harsh criticism for
lacking incentives to restructure. Funds in the Czech and Russian MPP, during the
early stages before concentration in hands of insiders, usually owned 20-30% of the
company and were likely to utilise their power without restructuring. The fund
management companies went for self-dealing such as tunnelling and siphoning.
13 This
was done through a set of special contracts and non-transparent side deals with firms
related to the fund management companies. In Poland the leading funds were
monitored by other minority funds and were considered important to the reputation of
the fund management company. Governance as well as the incentive structure of the
MPP was believed to reduce the principal–agent problems at the company level and
thus in the Polish programme the corporate governance problem was partly shifted
from the ‘enterprise level’ to the ‘fund level’, in other words, how funds monitored
and controlled themselves
14.
2.1. The ownership of the portfolio companies
Portfolio companies faced significant differences between the initially dispersed and
those with more concentrated ownership, in enabling funds to pursue their strategies.
To improve the efficiency of their governance structure NIFs decided to enter into
mutual agreements for the consolidation of shares:
 The first consolidation took place in October 1996 and six funds joined the
agreement
15– V NIF SA Victoria, VI NIF SA Magna Polonia, VIII NIF SA
Octavia, X NIF SA Foksal, XI NIF SA, XII NIF SA Piast. It referred to shares
of leading companies – the exchange included five different packages of
1.93% in different companies for one of 9.65% of one company focusing on
sectors in which they already owned companies. All together 162 companies
were subject to this exchange process. As a result the six funds had two types
of minority stake: 9.65% (the so called super-minority) in 27 companies and
12 Coffee John C. Jr., ‘Inventing a Corporate Monitor for Transitional Economics: The Uncertain
Lessons from the Czech and Polish Experiences’ in Frydman Roman, Gray Cheryl W., Rapaczynski
Andrzej (eds.), Corporate Governance in Central Europe and Russia , World Bank/CEU Press, 1996,
1, chap. 4, 134.
13 David Ellerman, ‘Voucher privatisation with investment funds: An institutional analysis’, World
Bank, 1997,
http://www.worldbank.org/html/dec/Publications/Workpapers/WPS1900series/wps1924/wps1924.pdf
[accessed on 11 April, 2002] (para. 3 of 12).
14 Hashi, “The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation with a difference”,
(para. 17 of 37).
15 Szczepkowska, ‘Funkcjonowanie przedsiębiorstw w ramach grup kapitałowych na przykładzie
Narodowych Funduszy Inwestycyjnych’, 10.94
1.93% in the rest of them. The ownership structure of these 162 companies
underwent significant concentration: one leading NIF (33%), one fund with
9.65% stake and nine minority fund-owners with stakes of 1.93%. From the
perspective of NIFs super-minority holdings were expected to have a premium
value over minority holdings as they would reduce the monitoring as well as
transaction costs. The reduction was probably insufficient as they still had
minority holdings in about 350 companies and as a result funds tended to sell
these minority stakes.
 In February 1998 the same six NIFs signed another agreement for share
consolidation aimed at further reducing the number of minority companies in
their portfolios.
2.2. The ownership of the NFIs
Additionally there was a trend towards ownership concentration at the fund level.
16
Financial institutions appeared to prefer the gradual purchasing of NIFs’ shares and
opted in many cases for concentrated ownership in the NIFs. One move toward the
trend was the merger of III NIF SA and XI NIF SA into Jupiter NIF on 31 December
2000. Researchers note that it is expected that over time the ownership of NIFs will
become more concentrated. The NIF formula created financial intermediaries
managing entrusted shares in the privatised companies in the name of the owners and
the costs of heavily dispersed ownership were substantial.
17 As a result, NIFs were
controlled by powerful financial groups.
Table 2: The dominant shareholders of NIFs
The dominant shareholder Shares in NIF The management company
PEKAO SA NIF Jupiter – 32,76% Trinity Management
BRE BANK SA I NIF – 14,2%
V NIF – 15%
XIII NIF – 9,8%
XIV NIF – 5%
BRE Private Equity
PZU S.A. II NIF – 20,2%
IV NIF – 21,34%
IX NIF – 21,71%
PZU NIF Management
WBK AIB
CA IB
VI NIF – 21,57%
XV NIF – 53,73%
AIB WBL Fund
Management
CA IB Management
Copernicus/ NIF Fund
Holdings
VIII NIF – 32%
XII NIF – 25,5%
KP Consortium Ltd.
Source: Hashi The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation
with a difference’, p. 8 and own research.
16 Considering the depth of Polish financial markets and the relatively small size of investment funds,
the law has provided some degree of protection against hostile takeovers in the first four years of NIFs
public trading. According to the provisions no single shareholder may own more that 5% of shares of a
fund in the first two years of the programme. The proportion was increased to 10% and 20% in the
third and fourth year. Some institutions predicted takeovers of many NIFs within six months after
listing funds on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. However for the whole period of time, there was no sign
of a takeover attempt.
17 Izabela Koładkiewicz, ‘The institutional shareholder – best practice: the National Investment Funds’
experience, Corporate governance, 10, 2002, 3, 183.95
2.3. Supervisory boards of portfolio companies
The funds together usually controlled the supervisory boards of the companies since
the two other stakeholders who were entitled to representation on the board had a
modest number of seats. It was in their interest if NIFs coordinated their actions and
in that way gained an effective voice on supervisory boards. Thus, from the
beginning, there was an implicit agreement amongst NIFs that the lead fund should
also nominate the representative of minority funds. Since the Treasury was a passive
investor, the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour by the lead fund increased.
Although the role of the minority NIFs might seem to be marginal, they appeared to
monitor the lead funds to some extent and therefore enhanced the governance
structure, demanding for instance the disclosure of detailed financial information
about portfolio companies. Their importance decreased as the funds disposed of
minority shareholdings.
3. Assessment of the programme
The results of the NIF scheme with respect to the restructuring and enhancement of
the companies’ value remains relatively blurred and inconclusive. The research
evidence differs significantly: some researchers criticise the scheme heavily claiming
that the Polish mass privatisation programmes failed to provide the expected results,
18
while others, however, express positive opinions towards the goals that were to be
achieved.
19 The assessment of the programme is analysed below according to the
criteria listed in the introduction to the paper.
3.1. Shifting the ownership form state to private hands
From the beginning of the programme until the end of 2001 the State Treasury sold its
stakes in 115 companies for over $195 million and in the case of 112 companies the
state withdrew completely. At the end of 2001 the state was still involved in 381
companies, standing at 74.4% of the initial portfolio with an average stake between
10.7%-16.1%. This number is far from impressive and in the opinion of some
researchers it contributed to the negative aspects of the Polish MPP. The Table shows
state involvement in NIF at the end of 2004.
18 Irena Grosfeld, Thierry Tressel, ‘Competition and corporate governance: Substitutes or
complements? Evidence from the Warsaw Stock Exchange’, William Davidson Institute Working
Paper, no. 369, 2001, http://wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wd369.pdf [accessed on
10 April 2002], (para. 20-1 of 41).
19 Simon Commander, Mark Dutz, Nicholas Stern, ‘Restructuring in transition economies: Ownership,
competition and regulation’, World Bank, 2001,
http://www.worldbank.org/research/abcde/washington_11/pdfs/stern.pdf [accessed on 6 April, 2002]
(para. 30-2 of 43).96
Table 3: State involvement in NIFs (December 2004)
Fund Number of shares Stake (%)
Fund I NIF 471,800 3.14
Jupiter NIF 2,972,527 5.71
NIF Progress 591,314 2.49
V NIF Victoria 917,036 6.10
NIF Magna Polonia 1,947,719 6.48
NIF Octava 4, 418,755 18.36
NIF Foksal 3,018,153 14.06
NIF Fortuna 1,071,922 7.13
Zachodni NIF 1,297,141 6.08
Source: Source: Ministry of State Treasury, ‘Report of NIF programme 1997-2003’,
p. 52-3.
3.2. The privatisation to strategic investors and restructuring of the companies
Fund management companies carried out restructuring by assigning each 5-6 portfolio
companies to a small team of their employees. Each team was directed by an
investment director or a portfolio manager who assisted the companies in preparing
their strategic plan
20. As far as the restructuring activity is concerned evidence shows
that labour shedding amounted to 10 and 20% between 1996 and 2000. Fund teams
pursued significant changes especially in strategic management, production lines and
product designs as well as budgeting, accounting and the compensation system.
Approximately 300 companies that joined the NIF programme were subject to deep
organisational and financial restructuring, including debt conversion, the
reorganisation and implementation of new accountancy rules and improvements to the
top management teams.
The NIFs’ investments in portfolio companies between 1996-1997 is estimated at
PLN 293 million in lead companies and PLN 203 million in minority companies.
Additionally, strategic investors invested PLN 173 million. The data as of 30
September 2001 shows that NIFs invested 898.2 million PLN in the restructuring
programmes in leading companies and 241.8 million PLN in minority companies.
Altogether NIFs invested 1,140.3 PLN million which accounts for 62.4% of the gains
realised from the sale of the companies. Meanwhile the sale of companies to strategic
investors generated around 639 million PLN for NIFs, whereas the average income of
NIFs from the disposal of portfolio companies in 1996-98 is estimated at PLN 143
million.
Due to the poor economic situation, portfolio companies entering the liquidation and
bankruptcy process accounted for 20% of the overall number. At the end of 2001 16%
of these cases were completed. Seven were revoked, whereas thirteen companies were
subject to liquidation. The decisive strategy of the NIFs towards bankruptcy and
liquidation proceedings may be linked to a more favourable position for the
implementing of these politically unpopular procedures for companies that were
considered to be financially unviable. The funds were simply better placed, as
compared with the state, which was constrained by political pressures, to pursue the
closure of unprofitable companies. Until 30 September 2001 NIFs sold 325 out of 512
20 Hashi ‘The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation with a difference’,
(para. 24 of 37).97
companies (63% of their portfolios). More than half of the NIF portfolio companies
found strategic investors and in two thirds of cases these were industrial-related
investors. Some companies, mostly those in poor financial conditions were sold to
insiders while at the end of 2001 shares in 26 companies were traded on the Warsaw
Stock Exchange and ten on off-exchange market (CTO). At the end of September
2001 187 companies were still under the management of NIFs. The recent report of
the State Treasury (2005) summarised NIF privatisation scheme indicating that out of
512 companies covered by the programme at the end of 2004:
 in 232 companies (46%) privatisation was fully completed;
 130 companies were liquidated;
 5 companies were merged in other units;
 135 were actively controlled by the state.
The table below presents the breakdown of all the NFIs portfolios.
Table 4: Leading companies in NIFs portfolios
NFI Number of leading
companies in
portfolio as of 1998
Number of leading
companies in
portfolio as of Sept
30, 2001
Number of leading
companies in portfolio as
of Nov 2006
01 NIF 35 10 Closing its activity
02 NIF 34 19 Closing its activity
03 NIF 34 11 0 (fund holds bonds and
shares in 4 companies)
04 NIF 35 16 Closing its activity
05 NIF 35 7 Closing its activity
06 NIF 35 10 5
07 NIF 34 28 4
08 NIF 34 8 0 (fund holds in 5 real
estate-related companies)
09 NIF 34 11 Closing its activity
10 NIF 33 13 Closing its activity
11 NIF 33 11 0 (merged with 03 NIF)
12 NIF 34 10 New strategy specialising
in real estate
13 NIF 34 4 0, fund is closing its
activity
14 NIF 34 12 Closing its activity
15 NIF 35 13 New strategy specialising
in management of non-
food consumer brands
Source: own calculations based on data from NIF annual reports and websites.
However, the strategy of the NIFs with respect to their role differs significantly. Some
of the NIFs actively searched for strategic investors and carried out the reorganisation,
whereas some others perceived themselves as purely financial investment funds98
focusing more on trading shares and other securities on domestic and foreign markets.
As the evidence shows many funds decided to pursue a very easy strategy – instead of
actively restructuring portfolio companies they sold the most attractive assets to other
investors and purchased bonds or other financial instruments. The quick liquidation
assets strategy is the biggest disappointment of the NIF scheme.
3.3. Increase in firm value, improvement in productivity, investment, and sales
Approximately, 30% of portfolio companies were recording losses at the time of
joining the programme. Most of them represented problematic sectors such as: meat,
clothing, coal mining and steel. Despite significant restructuring efforts,
improvements in profitability (or reductions in losses) and labour, the productivity of
portfolio companies showed significant long-turn market underperformance.
21
However, other research evidence shows that the firms included in the mass
privatisation programme showed rapid improvements in their profitability before
these companies were virtually privatised.
22 The proportion of the leading companies
recording losses increased in 1996 before dropping to 29% in 1998. 71% in 1999 and
48% in 2000 of the leading companies generated net profits.
Despite important restructuring efforts carried out by the NIFs, their performance
has been rather disappointing. The dividend paid by the funds was very small if any.
The net assets value of most NIFs has not kept up with inflation.
23 Compared to 1997
the net asset value plummeted significantly which is perceived as opposite to the goals
of the programme and government laws (figure 4).
Figure 4: Value of NIF assets (bln PLN)
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Source: Ministry of State Treasury, ‘Report of NIF programme 1997-2003’, p. 16.
21 Aussenegg, ‘Going public in Poland: Case-by-case privatisation, mass privatisation and private
sector initial public offerings’, para. 25 of 44).
22 Commander, Dutz, Stern, ‘Restructuring in transition economies: Ownership, competition and
regulation’ (para. 31-2 of 43).
23 Hashi, ‘The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation with a difference’,
(para. 34 of 37).99
The breakdown of the asset value of individual NIFs is presented in table 5.
Table 5: Net assets value of NIFs (million, PLN)
NIF End 1996 1
st quarter
1997
End 2000 End 2001 End
2003
I NIF S.A. 440 412 190 184 155
II NIF S.A. 470 459 155 146 140
IV NIF S.A Progress 390 405 230 190 175
V NIF S.A Victoria 340 299 150 135 120
VI NIF S.A Magna
Polonia
350 328 240 200 180
VII NIF S.A im.
Kazimierza
Wielkiego
390 378 100 107 98
VIII NIF S.A Octava 380 347 340 331 250
IX NIF S.A im. E.
Kwiatkowskiego
390 370 350 318 280
X NIF S.A Foksal 500 464 170 146 100
XII NIF S.A Piast 410 382 130 101 45
XIII NIF S.A
Fortuna
500 378 200 185 160
XIV NIF S.A
Zachodni
380 374 220 211 170
XV NIF S.A Hetman 410 401 270 131 70
NIF Jupiter (II NIF
and XI NIF merged)
760 746 500 414 230
Source: based on Szczepkowska, ‘Funkcjonowanie przedsiębiorstw w ramach grup
kapitałowych na przykładzie Narodowych Funduszy Inwestycyjnych’, p.12-13;
Ministry of State Treasury, ‘Report of NIF programme 1997-2003’, p. 17.
The loss of investment activity tends to be the major weakness of the NIFs. Despite
the intensive sale of shares, the majority of capital was allocated in risk-averse bonds
and debt securities which were unable to cover the losses of the portfolio companies.
The loss on investment activity reached 16.42 million PLN at the end of 2001. The
total profit of the NIFs in 2001 was negative as well and accounted for 51.2 million
PLN,
24 which amounts to thirty-seven percent of the previous year’s loss.
25 Figure 5
presents the net profit generated by NIFs during the period 1996-2003.
24 Hashi, ‘The Polish National Investment Fund Programme: Mass privatisation with a difference’,
(para. 26 of 37).
25 Nevertheless ca. half of the NIFs generated positive profits at the end of 2001.100
Figure 5: Net profit (loss) generated in NIFs, 1996-2003, mln PLN
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Source: Source: Ministry of State Treasury, ‘Report of NIF programme 1997-2003’,
p. 21.
3.4. The pace and scope of privatisation
The mass privatisation programme definitely contributed to the acceleration and the
increasing scope of the privatisation process although it covered merely 512
companies and when compared to other CEE countries this appears to be minimal.
For instance the MPP covered 1,800 companies in the Czech Republic and 15,000
companies in Russia. On the other hand the long duration of the scheme
implementation raises questions as to whether the pace of privatisation could have
been slower or faster if alternative methods had been used.
3.5. Lower costs of ownership change
It is extremely difficult to judge if the mass privatisation programme led to the
reduction of the costs of ownership transformation. During the transition period
Poland relied mostly on case-by-case privatisation, while on the other hand in cases of
direct sale to investors allowed the generation of revenues needed for reforms. The
mass privatisation programme was not costly since it was to a large extent financed by
the World Bank. The sale of stakes in only 115 companies generated over 745 million
PLN (approximately $195 million) for the state which remains pretty moderate for
privatisation revenues. Table 6 compares privatisation by three main methods.101
Table 6: Comparison of privatisation by indirect, direct and NIF method
Element Indirect
privatisation
(1990-2003)
NIF programme
(1995-2003)
Direct
privatisation
(1990-2003)
Investment (mln PLN) 69, 655 6, 014 4, 955
Investment in
environment protection
(mln PLN)
4, 662 674.5 225
Employment 217, 097 63, 631 87, 747
Average salary (PLN) 2, 929 2, 270 2,130
Source: Source: Ministry of State Treasury, ‘Report of NIF programme 1997-2003’,
39.
3.6. Distribution of the ‘national’ wealth and boosting the public interest in the stock
market
The mass privatisation programme played a marginal role in Polish transformation.
26
The NIF scheme did not manage to encourage interest in the stock market. Public
interest in the programme peaked during the certificate distribution and conversion
then dropped afterwards. The average Pole did not feel any significant impact of the
distribution of the wealth accumulated during socialism as the value of the certificate
was very low. The majority of citizens decided either to sell the certificates even
before they were converted into the 15 NIF shares or the NIF shares in the very first
weeks of their trading and therefore interest in the stock market as such, was
significantly limited.
3.7. Development of corporate governance mechanisms
Avoiding a control vacuum
The NIF structure is characterised by the dominant position of one leading fund, the
incentive of compensation for the fund management companies, the participation of
the reputational foreign investors and the regulatory framework of the scheme,
provided monitoring mechanisms and avoided a control vacuum (no dispersed
ownership structure). The available data on the mass privatisation programme
delivered evidence that the NIF structure did not suffer from a control vacuum which
was common in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Russia. Just the opposite: it created
a complicated and multi-level structure that caused the overlapping of competence of
various agents and might in effect have led to higher transaction costs.
Designing a structure of sound governance mechanisms
The NIF structure may appear to be relatively successful with respect to the active
role of funds, monitoring, incentive structures and restructuring results, yet some
26 Michał Federowicz , ‘Corporate governance and industrial relations in Poland’, Centre for the Study
of Economic and Social Change in Europe, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, Working
Paper, no. 28, 2003, [accessed on 8 May 2005] (para. 17 of 22).102
researchers claim that more attention should have been given to managerial incentives
and supervision.
27 An MPP scheme that from the start adds one level of intermediary
institutions as in the Polish case produced a complicated, multi-level structure that is
associated with the problem of ‘who monitors the monitors’.
28
Additionally the trend towards increasing the concentration NIF ownership was
accompanied with the extensive buy back programmes introduced by many funds.
Therefore authors claim we can observe the phenomenon of ‘disappearing’ NIFs.
Data shows that investors involved in the NIF structures tended to merge or buy back
its shares and dissemble the funds. On average the NIFs bought back more than 10%
of their own shares
29. Investors (mostly foreign, powerful financial groups) that
dominated the NIF ownership tended to be involved in other Polish companies but
outside the NIF structure.
Evolvement of active institutional investors
The current NIF involvement in new Polish companies is marginal and in the non-
MPP companies appears to be relatively modest. Funds are de facto in legal and
organisational terms diversified conglomerates acting as closed investment funds
30.
3.8. NIF scheme versus other privatisation methods applied in Poland
Privatisation is an indisputable positive for the companies.
31 There is however no
agreement about the scheme and the pace of the process.
32 Comparative studies of
privatisation schemes in Poland show that the identity of the owner matters
significantly. Outsider-owned privatised firms noted significantly higher annual
revenue growth than either state or insider-owned firms. Firms privatised to outsiders,
particularly to foreigners, tended to perform better in terms of labour productivity and
investment.
33 Privatisation to investment funds is five times more productive as
27 Grosfeld, Tressel, ‘Competition and corporate governance: Substitutes or complements? Evidence
from the Warsaw Stock Exchange’ (para. 15 of 41).
28 Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in transition’, (para. 12 of 42).
29 Hetman NIF bought 50% of its shares, Kwiatowski NIF bought 25% of its share, NIF Progress –
20%, NIF Octavia – 19%, Drugi NIF and NIF Jupiter 9-13%. Apparently, the tendency toward
increasing ownership concentration results also from the ending time of the programme and associated
payoff from the State Treasury and thus the ownership block enjoys higher premia. Some observers
claim that the new, more concentrated structures evolving currently show higher efficiency since they
eliminate one layer of agents in the corporate governance structure as noted by Maciej Samcik ‘Wokół
parkietu: NFI Hetman może zniknąć’,2002, Gazeta Wyborcza – on line resources,
http://www2.gazeta.info/elemnty/druk.jsp?xx=1121702&plik=/htm/1121/a1121702.html; Maciej
Samcik ‘Czy Prokom zainwestuje w fundusze NFI należące do PZU?’ 2002; Gazeta Wyborcza – online
resources,
http://www2.gazeta.info/elemnty/druk.jsp?xx=1131064&plik=/htm/1131/a1131064.html
30 Szczepkowska, ‘Funkcjonowanie przedsiębiorstw w ramach grup kapitałowych na przykładzie
Narodowych Funduszy Inwestycyjnych’, 11-2.
31 Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in transition’, (para. 24 of 42)
32 Svejnar, ‘Transition economies: Performance and Challenges’ (para. 8 of 45); Gerald Mc-Dermott,
‘Network restructuring and firm creation in East-Central Europe: A public-private venture’, William
Davidson InstituteWorking Paper, no. 361, 2000,
http://wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wd361.pdf [accessed on 10 April 2002] (para.
7-8 of 56).
33 Commander, Dutz, Stern, ‘Restructuring in transition economies: Ownership, competition and
regulation’ (para. 15-16 of 43); Roman Frydman, Cheryl W., Gray, Marek Hessel, Andrzej
Rapaczynski, ‘The limits of discipline’, Economics of Transition, 8, 2000: 579.103
privatisation to insiders, whereas privatisation to foreigners and blockholders is three
times more productive as privatisation to insiders. Concentrated ownership is
beneficial
34 but as shown by Grosfeld and Tressel
35 the controlling shareholder in
Poland has a negative effect, when a CEO, bank or NIF controls the company.
36
Relative to MEBOs, mass privatisation and direct sales more than double the
productivity change recorded over the subsequent two years, with the effect slightly
stronger for direct sales. Insider privatisation has been mostly associated with low
investment, limited managerial change and product innovation.
37 Table 7 presents
performance of companies privatised by the NIF scheme as compared companies
privatised by other methods.
Table 7: Performance of privatised companies in 2003
Method No Loss
making
(net)
Cost
ratio
Operating
ration
Net
operating
ratio
Liquidity
ratio
Total 2,434 34.7 93.5 5.9 4.4 24.4
Sole State
Treasury
companies
337 39.5 87.3 10.9 9.8 28.8
NIF 367 43.3 98.4 1.9 0.6 13.2
Indirect
privatisation
275 32.4 94.0 6.0 3.9 30.3
Controlled
by the state
174 35.6 102.7 -2.7 -4.0 14.7
Debt swaps 12 58.3 106 -5.7 -5.8 16.9
EBO 1092 25.7 96.9 3.1 1.9 32.6
In process
of direct
privatisation
18 83.3 90.2 9.6 17.0 1.0
Source: Source: Ministry of State Treasury, ‘Report of NIF programme 1997-2003’,
35.
As shown in the table performance of companies privatised by the NIF scheme
remains disappointing.
34 Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in transition’, (para. 25 of 42).
35 Grosfeld, Tressel, ‘Competition and corporate governance: Substitutes or complements? Evidence
from the Warsaw Stock Exchange’ (para. 20-1 of 41).
36 In the Czech Republic ownership concentration is associated with better performance as long as
strategic investor other than investment fund is the author of this concentration as noted by Andrew
Weiss, Georgiy Nikitin, ‘Performance of Czech companies by ownership structure’, William Davidson
Institute Working Paper, no. 186, 1998,
http://wdi.umich.edu/files/Publications/WorkingPapers/wd186.pdf [accessed on 3 April 2002], (para. 3
of 45).
37 Commander, Dutz, Stern, ‘Restructuring in transition economies: Ownership, competition and
regulation’ (para. 15-6 of 43).104
3.9. Polish NIFs versus the MPP in other Central and East European countries
Research shows that 19 out of 25 transition countries used some form of mass
privatisation as either a primary or secondary method,
38 although the applied schemes
varied significantly in terms of structure, pace and governance mechanisms that
eventually evolved. In most of the Central and East European countries mass
privatisation programmes were implemented earlier and faster than in Poland. A total
of 512 Polish companies privatised via 15 investment funds amounts to a marginal
share of all companies as opposed to many of Central and East European countries:
some 600 funds were created for 2,352 privatised companies in the Czech scheme
39
whereas the Russian MPP covered 14,000 medium and large enterprises accounting
for two thirds of the industrial labour in terms of employment.
Russia and Ukraine implemented rapid mass privatisation and relied mostly on
management-employee buyouts, whereas the Czech Republic, Lithuania and to a
lesser extent Slovakia based their programmes upon equal-access voucher distributing
the shares among the society
40 and privatising the companies via investment funds.
41
The rapid mass privatisation was crucial from the perspective that it used the window
of opportunity and eliminated the threat of reform regression. On the other hand, the
equal-access voucher privatisation allowed for speedy and relatively fair distribution
of the nation’s wealth. However, neither method contributed to the emergence of new
investment funds nor generated resources for government. Moreover, both led to a
poor corporate governance structure.
42 Rapid mass privatisation failed to provide the
existing management with incentives or the tools for improving efficiency. The equal-
access voucher privatisation resulted in dispersed ownership since the programme
usually involved the whole population of a country. Researchers argue that the failure
of the voucher mass privatisation to provide effective governance structure is rooted
in the structure of long agency chains since a citizen who receives a privatisation
voucher cannot provide appropriate incentives for corporate control.
43 From this
perspective the voucher investment funds provided a ‘vehicle for high abuse’
44. The
dispersed ownership resulted in a control vacuum which in turn led to tunnelling
carried out by managers or majority shareholders at the expense of minority
shareholders
45. Moreover, the Czech case shows that the investment privatisation
funds acted more like agents than owners since they were receiving a management fee
but did not benefit from any increase in the equity value. Additionally since the stock
38 Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in transition’, (para. 12 of 42).
39 Coffee, ‘Privatisation and corporate governance: The lessons from securities market failure’, (para.
22 of 71).
40 Svejnar, ‘Transition economies: Performance and Challenges’ (para. 31 of 45).
41 Coffee, ‘Inventing a corporate monitor for transitional economics: The uncertain lessons from the
Czech and Polish experiences’, 122.
42 Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in transition’,(para 12-4 of 42); Coffee, ‘Privatisation
and corporate governance: The lessons from securities market failure’, (para 24 of 71).
43 Joseph Stiglitz , ‘Whiter reform?’, ABCDE Conference Washington D.C., World Bank 1999; Joseph
Stiglitz, ‘Quis custodiet ipsos custodes? Corporate governance failures in the transition’, ABCDE
Conference, Paris, World Bank, 1999 as quoted in Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in
transition’, (para. 14 of 42).
44 Joseph Stiglitz, ‘The role of government in economic development’, in Michael Bruno, Borin
Pleskovic (eds.) Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington D.C.,
World Bank, pp. 11-23 as quoted in Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in transition’,
(para. 14 of 42).
45 Coffee, ‘Privatisation and corporate governance: The lessons from securities market failure’, (para 23
of 71); Svejnar, ‘Transition economies: Performance and Challenges’, (para. 12 of 42).105
market was small, institutional investors were locked in without a choice of either exit
or voice.
46 However, in principle it was possible for financial intermediaries to
concentrate their voucher holdings and carry out the effective monitoring as happened
in Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia and to some extent in the Czech Republic, although
the ‘who monitors whom’ structure was not always clear
47.
Further research indicates the crucial role of the regulatory and institutional regime
that created the framework for privatisation
48. In the Czech case regulations allowed
for trading the shares for companies subject to privatisation outside the stock
exchange and trading on the Prague Stock Exchange (PSE) did not require
contemporaneous price reporting which contributed to the systematic looting of Czech
companies by their controlling shareholders (IPFs) and the expropriation of the
remaining minority shareholders.
49 As result of these problems between 1995 and
1999 the number of companies listed on the PSE fell by more than 80% (from 1,716
to 301). Therefore, the quality of the regulation appears to be a crucial element in the
privatisation programme and the efficiency of new ownership structures.
Conclusions
The results of the Polish MPP are highly controversial and relatively blurred. Despite
a lot of criticism one can conclude the main goals were achieved. Restructuring was
carried out in most of the portfolio companies. Many of the NIF companies were sold
outside, mostly to strategic and industrial-related, investors. The financial results,
although still highly disappointing, improved. Comparative analysis shows that the
Polish MPP as opposed to the Czech, Slovak or Russian schemes provided a relatively
adequate control structure. It is however, harder to say to what extent looting was
reduced. The structure which introduced one additional level of agents turned out to
be complicated and costly. The investors involved in the NIF scheme were present in
the Polish market but outside of the NIF structure. The NIF structure was not as
efficient as one tailored by market institutions. It is however highly disputable
whether the MPP contributed to the development of governance mechanisms in
Poland. The NIFs were hardly involved in the ownership of Polish companies, they
evolved towards purely investment activity and ownership concentration appeared to
be the most significant control mechanisms used by the funds. The NIFs’ stake
accounted for between 10 to 16% ranging from an average of 21% of some privatised,
to 6% of new set companies.
50 Besides foreign and domestic companies, and to a
lesser extent banks, it is questionable whether other institutional investors would be
willing to engage in the active governance of Polish companies. On the other hand,
the change in the ownership and governance structures of both portfolio companies
and the NIFs indicates that ownership concentration is very important in transition
economies. Additionally, these changes show how the development and importance of
capital networks and shareholdings tended to play a crucial role in the Polish
governance system.
46 Coffee, ‘Inventing a corporate monitor for transitional economics: The uncertain lessons from the
Czech and Polish experiences’, 125
47 Estrin, ‘Competition and corporate governance in transition’, (para 12 of 42).
48 Edward Glaesser, Simon Johnson, Andrei Shleifer, ‘Coase versus Coasians’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 116, 2001, 3, 894.
49 Coffee, ‘Privatisation and corporate governance: The lessons from securities market failure’, (para.
31-2 of 71).
50 Grosfeld, Tressel, ‘Competition and corporate governance: Substitutes or complements? Evidence
from the Warsaw Stock Exchange’ (para. 18-9 of 41).106
Comparatively the Polish scheme is ‘the least mass’ of the MPPs in the transition
economies. Poland was the only country so far that administratively structured its
investment funds. Many experts indicate the deficiencies and negative aspects of mass
privatisation programmes across the CEE which may lead to the conclusion that the
scheme is wrong from the outset.
51 From this perspective the Polish model, although it
did not lead to efficient restructuring or emergence of corporate governance, was able
to minimise, but not fully eliminate, the most problematic aspects of mass
privatisation.
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